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Introduction 
The study of the effects of corruption has been a central concern for an increasing amount of 
scholars. Despite the debate over its definition, measurement, and methodology, the negative 
effects of corruption are widely accepted among academics and policymakers. Among other 
negative effects, corruption is argued to deteriorate the level of trust citizens have in the institutions 
of their country. Maintaining high levels of institutional trust, however, enhances both the 
legitimacy and the effectiveness of democratic government which means it is vital for keeping 
institutions well-functioning (Mishler & Rose, 2001, p.30). Studies have shown that countries in 
which citizens perceive more overall corruption, they are less likely to trust government institutions 
(Villoria, Van Ryzin, & Levena, 2012). In addition, countries that are associated with high levels 
of corruption as perceived by experts, instead of citizens, are also characterized by lower trust 
values in the democratic institutions of those countries (Clausen, Kraay, & Nyiri, 2011).   
 However, the empirical study of the effect of corruption on institutional trust has left some 
issues gone relatively unnoticed. The purpose of this study is to present an exploration of those two 
issues on the study of the effect of corruption on institutional trust by conducting my own empirical 
analysis focused on those concerns. The research question of this thesis attempts to assess the effect 
of corruption on institutional trust, which this thesis examines by conducting an empirical study of 
the data of 23 (mostly) European countries. This study proceeds by presenting the theoretical 
framework providing a review of the related empirical literature on corruption and institutional 
trust and the theory which links both concepts together. In this chapter, the main hypothesis will 
be presented which states that we expect to observe a negative relationship between corruption and 
institutional trust.  
 In the next chapter attention will be given to the methodology, data and case selection of 
this thesis. The data representing the independent variable in this study is gathered by studying the 
results of both expert (Corruption Perception Index) and public opinion based indicators (Global 
Corruption Barometer) measuring perceived corruption levels in 23 countries. The data on the 
dependent variable, institutional trust, is gathered by studying the results of a public opinion survey 
(European Social Study) measuring citizen confidence levels in the police, the legal system, the 
parliament and political parties of which the GCB also provides data at the level of those individual 
institutions. In addition to presenting the independent and dependent variables, the methodology 
section will focus on the two concerns that this study aims to explore. First, this thesis aims to 
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resolve an issue related to the similarity of perceived corruption indicators based on public opinion 
and expert assessment which are widely used in the study on the effect of corruption. Although the 
link between corruption and institutional trust has been studied by using either method, there seems 
to be disagreement on the similarity of both types of indicators based on two recent contributions. 
Whereas most authors agree that both type of indicators are highly similar, a recent contribution 
made by Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) suggests that, in fact, elite surveys are out of touch 
with public opinion based indicators measuring the level of perceived corruption. This stands in 
sharp contrast to the findings of Chabova (2016) which uses the same data sources, but argues that 
both methods provide results that are highly similar (GCB, CPI). I aim to address this issue by 
providing a comparison between the results of both indicators in the first part of the empirical 
section of this thesis.  
 Second, although most authors combine the results of institutional confidence levels of 
individual into an aggregate variable, both the results of public opinion surveys measuring 
perceived corruption levels and institutional confidence levels show a significant degree of 
variance between the most widely studied institutions on this topic suggesting citizens use 
relatively distinct evaluations for each institution. The second methodological contribution 
therefore sets out to investigate the relationship between both concepts at the level of those 
individual institutions.  
 This thesis argues that the exploration of the link between corruption and institutional trust 
conducted at the level of individual institutions, given the differences in the perceptions of citizens 
on both issues, can provide valuable on the relationship of this effect that would otherwise go 
unnoticed. If corruption effects trust in public institutions, we expect to observe that institutions 
that are perceived to be more corrupt, possess less confidence by citizens. By presenting the data 
on trust and perceived corruption levels in 4 distinct institutions, this thesis is able to capture the 
differences between the results of each variable. The nature of this thesis is exploratory in that it 
aims to capture, rather than to provide definitive explanations of the findings that follows the 
unique method of studying the effect of corruption on institutional trust presented in this thesis.  
 The next chapter presents the empirical analysis of this this thesis that is divided per each 
methodological concern that this thesis aims to explore. In the first part, my findings show that 
both expert and public opinion surveys are very similar in my data sample of 23 countries, but this 
strong relationship between both indicators changes if we move to the bigger sample that Rose-
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Ackerman and Palifka (2016) base their observations on. It is interesting to note that the results on 
citizen perception of corruption do not show the high degree of variance that expert perception of 
corruption does between both sample sizes. Based on those observations, a preliminary analysis of 
what could account for those differences will be presented.  
 The findings of the second part of the empirical analysis confirms the negative relationship 
between corruption and institutional trust. The correlation analysis between the dependent and 
independent variables conducted at the level of individual institutions suggests in general, the effect 
of corruption on institutional trust is strongest when we study the results of confidence levels and 
perceived corruption levels of each individual institution, suggesting citizens make distinct 
evaluations in how corrupt, and how much confidence they possess in public institutions. However, 
this effect is found to be stronger in the case of some institutions (the police and political parties) 
and weaker for others (the parliament and the judiciary). This thesis also presents a comprehensive 
overview of the country results of all variables grouped per institution which the research design 
of this thesis allows for.   
 The country level details of the results presented in this thesis show interesting variation 
exists within the results on each institution, between groups of countries and provide interesting 
insight to the evaluation of corruption and institutional trust in specific countries. Those findings 
incite questions such as: Why do citizens in France and Belgium possess much confidence in the 
police while they perceive it to be relatively corrupt? What can explain the fact that citizens in 
Russia possess relatively high confidence levels in their public institutions (expect the police) while 
they perceive them as relatively corrupt? By merit of studying the dependent and independent 
variables at the level of individual institutions this thesis is able to provide an exploration of the 
differences between those countries that have gone relatively unnoticed in most studies on this 
topic. However, due to the dimension of conducting the analysis that thesis presents, and given the 
time and format limitations of this research project, the nature of this thesis remains somewhat 
exploratory. Additional research is needed to help explain the findings of this thesis by studying 
the individual level characteristics of the data analyzed in this thesis. However, this thesis argues 
that those findings by itself provide valuable and unique insight to the study of corruption and 
institutional trust that is not captured by other studies on this topic. 
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Theoretical framework 
This chapter presents a review of the related literature on the relationship between corruption and 
institutional trust, out of which the main hypothesis of this thesis follows. The research question of 
this thesis is formulated as follows: “Does corruption influence trust in political institutions?” In 
the first part of this chapter an overview will be given of the empirical studies on this topic, 
followed by a short section on the theory that links both concepts together. Although there are 
multiple ways of how to define corruption, this thesis focuses on the definition as “the misuse of 
public office for private financial gain” following most empirical studies on this topic (Pellegata & 
Memoli 2016, p.395). This study focuses on the effect of corruption by studying subjective 
indicators that capture the phenomenon. In contrast, objective data on corruption involves data 
sources that focus on the instances of corruption that can be gathered from conviction rates, judicial 
records and reports from anticorruption agencies. Obtaining reliable data of the instances of 
corruption is proven to be very difficult, and cross-country comparisons almost impossible due to 
the issue of the credibility of the institutions that gather their own data and the possible bias of 
(corruption) press reports (Morris 2008, p.390). For those reasons, corruption is predominantly 
measured by focusing on subjective indicators that measure the phenomenon in different ways. 
This section focuses on the empirical findings of three groups of studies presenting the findings of 
the effects of corruption using subjective indicators of corruption on institutional trust following 
Pellegata and Memoli (2016) and Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri (2011). 1  
 The first group of empirical studies investigate the country-level variation of corruption and 
its relation to institutional trust by relying on indicators such as the CC and the CPI-index that are 
based on the perceptions of country experts and businessmen. One of the most influential studies 
that focuses on expert indicators of corruption is presented by Anderson and Tverdova (2003) in 
which they study the results of country level data generated by the CPI-index and household survey 
data on institutional trust levels in 16 developed countries. The authors conclude that corruption is 
negatively associated with political support and that it erodes trust in political institutions. In 
addition, van der Meer's study (2010) focuses on the level of trust in the parliament of 27 European 
countries investigating the correlation between trust levels and the result of country level corruption 
indicators (CPI-index). Van der Meer concludes that confidence in the parliament is lower in 
countries where corruption is more widespread. Lastly, the study of Wagner et al. (2009) which is 
                                                 
1 See Morris (2008) for an excellent discussion on the methodological differences between the different indicators of corruption. 
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based on a panel study of 16 Western European countries states that more efficient and less corrupt 
institutions (measured by the CCI-index) are characterized by the positive evaluation of citizens in 
their satisfaction with democracy.   
 A second group of studies focuses on the link between corruption and institutional trust 
based on citizen perception of corruption. As such citizens, instead of experts, are asked how 
corrupt they perceive different institutions to be. The study of Mishler and Rose (2001) empirically 
shows that high levels of mass perception of corruption deteriorates political support in (10) post-
communist countries. This finding is supported by the study of Chang and Chu (2006) in which 
they demonstrate the strong corrosive effect of corruption (as perceived by citizens) on the level of 
trust in political institutions in Asian democracies. In addition, Villoria, Van Ryzin and Levena 
(2012) find that citizens who perceive more overall corruption are less likely to trust their fellow 
citizens and much less likely to trust government institutions in their case study on perceived 
corruption levels and institutional trust in Spain. Those conclusions are further strengthened by a 
study using the Afrobarometer survey as Bratton (2007) shows that citizens’ perception of 
corruption is negatively associated with the satisfaction of public services.    
 In the third group of studies corruption is operationalized by analyzing individual level data 
focusing on corruption experience. As such, citizens are asked whether they have experienced 
corruption in their dealings with public institutions or authorities. Seligson (2002) empirically 
shows that people who have experienced corruption are less likely to believe in the legitimacy of 
their political system by studying the results of political support data in four Latin American 
countries. Those findings are supported by the study of Cho and Kirwin (2007) who find that 
citizens’ experience with corruption lowers their trust in political institutions in a study of 17 
countries using the Afrobarometer survey. Cho and Kirwin argue, however, that the relationship 
between institutional trust and experience with corruption is circular. Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri 
(2011) have set out to study this causal effect between reported institutional confidence and 
corruption experience. Instead, the authors suggest that the relationship between corruption and 
institutional trust is much more likely to be interpreted to be a causal effect running from the former 
to the latter (p.243). The empirical literature on corruption and institutional trust shows that both 
the perception and experience with corruption has a strong negative effect on the level of trust that 
citizens have in their institutions. The theoretical basis behind this relationship will be presented 
next.  
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 The theory that links both concepts together is based on two important negative effects of 
corruption on citizen trust levels in their institutions. First, public officials that are corrupt 
undermine the principles of democratic accountability and the fairness and impartiality of political 
institutions (Chang & Huang, 2016, p.29). In short, institutions are expected by citizens to serve 
the public domain and rule impartially, which corrupt public officials undermine. Second, 
corruption increases the cost of public services and reduces its quality because it turns institutions 
to become rent-seeking instruments in the hands of the political and economic elite. The 
misallocation process by which corruption distorts the public demand will increase its costs and 
lower the  quality of public services (Pellegata & Memoli, 2016, p.295). In fact, low-quality 
governance can even be self-reinforcing as citizens are more motivated to bribe after losing their 
trust in the regimes ability to address their concerns (Chang & Huang, 2016, p.30).  
 Furthermore, corruption is argued to hinder economic development by lowering 
investment, misallocating human capital and undermining tax revenues (Ibid.). As Chang and 
Huang forcefully note: “corruption fundamentally betrays public trust, erodes democratic 
principles and lowers the quality of governmental performance” (Ibid., p.31). The main hypothesis 
of this thesis follows the scholarly consensus on the trust eroding effect of corruption. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Corruption negatively impacts the level of confidence in political institutions. 
 
This project tries to differentiate from other studies by focusing on distinct factors in the empirical 
study of the link between corruption and institutional trust that previous studies have not 
sufficiently expounded on. In the next section, the main purpose that structures the analyses 
conducted in this thesis will be explained after which the data and case selection central to this 
thesis will be presented.  
Methodology, data and case selection 
In this thesis corruption is operationalized by focusing on data that represents how corrupt both 
experts and citizens perceive their institutions and their public system to be. The empirical part of 
this thesis is divided into two parts that focus on two distinct contributions that this thesis aims to 
make. First, I aim to explore the issue of whether or not the results of expert and citizen based 
corruption perception indicators are similar to each other. Although the relationship between 
corruption and institutional trust has been studied by focusing on either expert (see Anderson and 
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Tverdova, 2003) or mass perception of corruption (see Chang & Huang, 2016), few studies 
investigate the differences in results of both methods in context of the effect of corruption on 
institutional trust (Pellegata & Memoli, 2016).   
 Most authors find that, in general, mass perception based indices are reliable indicators of 
corruption. This conclusion on the similarity of types of indicators is shared by many authors 
(Heath, Richards, & de Graaf, 2016; Chabova, 2016; Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010). However, 
this conclusion is not uncontested. In their new edition of the influential ‘Corruption and 
Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform’  Rose-Ackerman & Palifka (2016) suggest that, 
in fact, citizen perception and that of experts seem out of touch based on a comparison between the 
CPI and GCB indicator. This is remarkable, as Chabova (2016) finds that both methods are highly 
similar based on the same data sources (the GCB and CPI indicator). The first part of this thesis 
sets out to explore this issue using the same data as used by Rose-Ackerman and Palifka in their 
study (2016).   
 The second methodological contribution that is advanced in this thesis follows my 
exploration on the similarity of public and expert indicators of corruption. While using the same 
data sources that are central to this comparison, the second part of the empirical section of this 
thesis instead focuses on the methodological concern based on how corruption and institutional 
trust are measured in most studies. Most scholars operationalize institutional trust by studying the 
results of public opinion surveys measuring institutional trust at the system level (Chang & Chu, 
2006; Morris & Klesner, 2010; Clausen et al., 2011; Chang & Huang, 2016; Pellegata & Memoli, 
2016). This means that the results of trust levels of multiple institutions are combined into one 
variable representing a combined value of institutional trust.2 However, this thesis argues that there 
are strong reasons to explore whether the analysis at the level of individual institutions can provide 
more precise and insightful results.  
 This is based on the degree of variance between the evaluation of distinct institutions that 
public opinion surveys measuring citizen evaluation of both concepts show to exist. On the one 
hand do public opinion surveys that measure citizen trust levels in individual institutions show that 
citizens have considerably more confidence in some institutions than they do in others (Mariën, 
2011, p.24-25). As Mariën observes, citizen have more confidence in implementing institutions 
                                                 
2 The study of Chang and Chu (2006) averages the level of institutional trust in 7 political institutions. Morris and Klesner (2008) combine the 
levels of trust in 10 institutions while Chang and Huang (2016) looks at the relationship between corruption and trust by averaging the results of 9 
political institutions. Lastly, Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri (2011) average the answers of a public opinion survey on 4 different institutions. 
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(the legal system and the police) than they have in representational institutions (the parliament, 
politicians and political parties; p.24). Differences between such evaluations cannot be captured by 
studying institutional trust at the system level. In addition, different mechanisms might be at play 
in the evaluation of different institutions, as Baboš (2014) shows that people who voted for the 
party in power possess more trust in political institutions (the electoral winner effect).  
  In addition to those differences between citizen trust levels of different institutions, citizens 
also perceive some institutions to be significantly more corrupt than others (Rose-Ackerman & 
Palifka, 2016, p.23). Studying the link between perceived corruption levels and institutional trust 
levels at the level of individual institutions can thus provide more precise results on the link 
between both concepts. The logical assumption underlying this statement is that if corruption 
influences the level of institutional trust, we expect institutions that are evaluated more corrupt to 
be less trusted. This observation can provide validation for the mechanisms by which corruption is 
argued to effect the level of institutional trust. This analysis can also provide valuable information 
on the evaluation of specific institutions per country that is not captured by other studies. For 
instance, it can show whether institutions in country x and y score relatively low on corruption, but 
possess high levels of trust in comparison to the evaluation of other countries which can provide a 
useful basis for explaining the mechanisms at play for additional research on this topic. The 
research design of this thesis is set up to capture this variation between the data on the dependent 
and independent variable that other studies cannot account for by studying the variables at the 
system level. 
 Dependent variable   
The level of institutional trust in four political institutions  
The dependent variable that is central to the second part of the empirical section of this thesis, 
institutional trust, is studied by analyzing the results of the European Social Survey (2012) that 
provides public opinion data of 23 European countries with a sample size of approximately 2000 
respondents per country.3 The ESS asks respondents much they personally trust a set of institutions, 
four of which coincide with the data presented in the GCB (the police, judiciary, parliament, and 
political parties). Answers range from 1 (don’t trust at all) to 10 (complete trust).  
 The analysis of corruption and institutional trust presented in this paper focuses on the 
                                                 
3 Both surveys are conducted at around the same time, that is, ranging from September 2012 to March 2013 which may vary between individual 
countries. For details on the collection of data of the GCB survey, see <https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/in_detail>. Information on the 
collection of data of the ESS (2012) can be found on <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/deviations_6.html>. 
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following (mostly European) countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Kosovo, Norway, Portugal, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.  
 
 Independent variables  
Perceived corruption level by experts 
The first independent variable used in this study is the most widely used indicator of corruption, 
Transparency International’s CPI-index. The CPI-index is a country-level indicator that represents 
the level of corruption as perceived by experts. It measures the perceived level of corruption on a 
scale of 1 to 100. The wide availability of country level data provided by the CPI index has resulted 
in it being the most widely used indicator in the study of the effect of corruption. In this study the 
results of the 2013 CPI index will be used.   
 
Perceived corruption level based on public opinion  
The second independent variable measures corruption perception levels by citizens. The Global 
Corruption Barometer (2013) will provide data on the perceived level of corruption on four 
institutions in addition to providing the results of citizens’ evaluation of the (whole) public sector. 
In this survey respondents are asked to what extent they think public institutions are affected by 
corruption. Answers range from 1 (not at all corrupt) to 5 (extremely corrupt) with a sample size 
of approximately 1000 respondents per country. Both the GCB and CPI index are developed 
Transparency International.  
Empirical analysis 
In this thesis I set out to make two methodological contributions to the empirical study of corruption 
and institutional trust. In the first section of this chapter, I aim to investigate whether expert and 
public opinion based corruption perception indicators are similar, or whether they are out of touch. 
In the second part, I aim to explore whether the analysis of the effect of corruption on institutional 
trust at the level of individual institutions can provide more precise and insightful results on the 
relationship between both concepts in an empirical study on the effect of perceived corruption 
levels and institutional trust levels in 23 (mostly European) countries. 
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 Comparing expert and mass indicators of corruption 
Most studies on the effect or corruption either focus on expert, or mass perception indicators of 
corruption. However, it is unclear whether expert based and public opinion based indicators 
(perceived) corruption provide similar results. On the one hand do many scholars note that both 
types of indicators provide similar results as noted in the methodological section. In this section I 
focus on the conflicting findings of authors that use the same data sources measuring expert and 
public opinion based perception (the results of the GCB and CPI indicators). The analysis of Rose-
Ackerman and Palifka in their new edition of the influential ‘Corruption and Government: Causes, 
Consequenses and Reform’ (2016) suggest that there is a very weak correlation between the opinion 
of experts with that of citizens. Rose-Ackerman and Palifka suggest that the results of their 
comparison between expert (CPI 2013) and mass perceptions of corruption (GCB 2013) indicate 
that both indicators seem “out of touch” with each other as they observe a weak negative correlation 
between both indicators with a very low r-square value of 0.15. This finding  seems to be in sharp 
contrast to the observation of Chabova (2016, p.16-18) in which the author argues that both 
indicators are, in fact, very similar.4  
 In order to investigate this issue, the results of the comparison made by Rose-Ackerman 
and Palifka (2016) are reproduced by employing several statistical tests using the same data sources 
(n=101). However, my analysis also includes the results of the much smaller set of 23 countries 
that is central to the second part of the empirical section of this thesis. Figure 1 shows my 
reproduction of the comparison made by Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, p.25) that shows the 
same results (n=101), while figure 2 presents the results of the comparison in the smaller set of 
countries (n=23).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Chabova (2016) finds the correlation coefficient between both indicators to be above 0.85 in multiple years (P<0.001).  
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Figure 1. Scatterplot CPI-GCB (n=101) Figure 2. Scatterplot CPI-GCB (n=23) 
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The observation made by Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) in which they suggest that expert and 
public perception indicators seem out of touch also follows from the scatterplot presented in figure 
1 that reproduces the comparison (n=101). The very low r-square value (0.15) indicates that the 
model explains a very small amount of variance between both indicators. However, the scatterplot 
in figure 2 provides a rather different view on the similarity of both indicators. We can observe that 
the data is less dispersed, and the r-square value has moved to 0.636. This indicates that the 
countries in the smaller dataset (n=23) are evaluated by both experts and citizens in a much more 
similar way with less variance between results of the individual countries. The distribution of the 
data behind both indicators can explain why figure 1 and 2 provide such different results. Figure 3 
and 4 show the distribution of all the data points (countries) on how corrupt experts (CPI) perceive 
individual countries to be. Figure 5 and 6 then present the boxplot of this distribution for the public 
opinion based corruption indicator (GCB). The results of figure 3 and 5 are based on the whole 
sample (n=101) whereas figure 4 and 6 focus on the smaller sample of countries (n=23). 
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Figure 3. Boxplot CPI (n=101) Figure 4. Boxplot CPI (n=23) 
Figure 5. Boxplot GCB (n=101) Figure 6. Boxplot GCB (n=23) 
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Figure 3 to 6 show that there are significant differences in the distribution between both sample 
sizes. It shows that while citizens perceive corruption in similar fashion in both sample sizes as 
shown by the similar dimensions of the boxplots in figure 5 and 6, there are significant differences 
in how corrupt experts evaluate countries to be between both sample sizes. Rose-Ackerman and 
Palifka (2016) note that there is much more variance in the CPI data, and based on the whole sample 
of 101 countries they suggest that elite surveys are out of touch (p.23-24). However, based on the 
smaller sample size a more nuanced view emerges on the similarity of both types of indicators as 
shown in the figures above.   
 In order to assess the weak negative relationship that Rose-Ackerman (2016) observe 
between both indicators, table 1 will present the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the CPI 
and the GCB grouped per sample size. 
 
Table 1. Correlation statistics CPI-GCB 
 GCB 2013 Sig. (2-tailed) GCB 2013 Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 101  23  
CPI -.389* 0.000 -.798* 0.000 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
The weak negative relationship between both indicators in the bigger sample size that the authors 
observe also follows from my analysis (-0.39). However, the correlation coefficient moves to -.798 
in the smaller sample of 23 (mostly) European countries which is much more similar to the 
observations of authors that argue that expert and citizen corruption indicators provide similar 
results (Chabova, 2016). What this shows is that the similarity between both indicators is highly 
dependent on the group of countries that are studied, and generalized statements on the similarity 
between the CPI and GCB seem inappropriate without taking into account the differences of the 
results between both sample sizes. But what does this say about the validity of both indicators? My 
findings seem to suggest that experts overestimate the level of corruption in a wide number of 
countries in the bigger data sample relative to how corrupt citizens perceive their country to be. It 
should be noted that further research is needed in which the results of corruption experience 
indicators and other data sources must be combined in order to assess which of the indicators is 
really out of touch, which unfortunately goes beyond the scope of this thesis in order to give 
definitive explanations.  
 However, a preliminary explanation will be presented next that explores on this issue. On 
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the one hand, it is likely that the scaling of the results of the CPI, which ranges from 0-100, accounts 
for the low observed similarity in the bigger sample size as there is less degree of variance possible 
in the results of the GCB due to the scaling of the results (which range from 0 to 5). In addition, 
the 23 (mostly) European countries of the smaller sample size fall in the category of relatively 
developed countries in the world in which we can safely assume corruption is less of a problem 
relative to the high amount countries in the developing world present in the bigger sample size. 
The question still left open, however, is why citizens in both sample sizes evaluate their public 
sector in equal fashion.  
 One possible explanation is given by Heath et al. (2016) in which they show that higher-
income individuals and individuals with higher education are more likely to perceive corruption, 
while higher income countries are also perceived as less corrupt by experts (p.67). The means that 
the expected relationship of finding high levels of perceived corruption (by citizens) in countries 
that are rated as very corrupt by experts is mitigated by the fact that such countries are characterized 
by having less citizens that are highly educated and a smaller amount of high-income citizens. 
Assuming there are more citizens with higher incomes and more citizens that are highly educated 
in higher-income countries (that experts thus rate as less corrupt) citizens rate their country more 
negatively than we could expect from the actual level of corruption present in those countries 
following this logic. 
 Statements like this which involve both system and individual level characteristics are very 
difficult to investigate and risk being an ecological fallacy, and providing a definitive answer is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. In this section, however, I set have out to study whether expert and 
public perception indicators are out of touch, or very similar following the seemingly contrasting 
statements of studies on this topic. My findings show that expert and citizen perception of 
corruption are closely aligned in the smaller sample central to this thesis, whereas they seem of 
touch with each other based whole sample of countries of which the CPI and GCB provide data.  
 The analysis of perceived corruption and institutional trust 
In this section the empirical analysis of the effect of corruption on institutional trust will be 
presented. As followed from my theoretical framework, I expect to observe a strong negative 
relationship between perceived corruption levels and the level of institutional confidence. In the 
methodology section, I’ve argued that studying the relationship between corruption and 
institutional trust at the level of individual institutions can provide more precise and insightful 
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results based on the differences in how citizens evaluate different institutions. Table 2 presents the 
question wording and descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this analysis. Data on the 
dependent variable, institutional trust, is gathered by calculating the country means of the European 
Social Survey (2012). The data representing the independent variables, the level of perceived 
corruption, is gathered by calculating the means of the results of the Global Corruption Barometer 
(2013) per institution, and by gathering the results of the overall country scores of the CPI indicator 
(2013). Both public opinion surveys provide results at the level of 4 political institutions, while the 
CPI provides an overall country score. The variable ‘institutional trust’ is created by averaging the 
country level results of all 23 countries on the four political institutions. By calculating this variable 
on basis of the scores of the four institutions, it to captures the level of institutional trust at the 
system similar to most studies on this topic. 
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As we observe in table 2, there are notable differences between the confidence levels and perceived 
corruption levels of all four institutions. In our sample of 23 European countries, the police are the 
most trusted of all institutions with a mean of 5.5, while political parties are least trusted with a 
mean of 3.1. Citizens also perceive the police as least corrupt (3.19) and rate political parties as 
most corrupt (3.92). The judiciary scores second best, followed by trust levels and perceived 
 Table 2. Question wording and descriptive statistics for analytical variables 
Variables  N Min Max Mean SD 
       
Dependent variable       
Question wording institutional trust  
(ESS 2012) 
On a score of 0-10, how much do you 
personally trust each of the following 
institutions. 0 means you do not trust an 
institution and 10 means you have complete 
trust (higher is better). 
 23 (169.911 total 
observations) 
0 10   
Trust in the police   23 2.05 8.1 5.56 1.44 
Trust in the legal system   23 1.87 7.68 4.60 1.58 
Trust in country’s parliament  23 1.85 6.3 3.9 1.29 
Trust in political parties  23 1.80 5.31 3.10 1.13 
       
Institutional trust   92 1.91 6.76 4.29 1.30 
       
Independent variables       
Question wording public perception of 
corruption (GCB 2013) 
To what extent do you see the following 
categories to be affected by corruption in this 
country? Please answer on a scale from 1 to 5, 
where 1 means ‘not at all corrupt’ and 5 means 
‘extremely corrupt’ (lower is better). 
23 (72.861 total 
observations) 
1 5   
Perceived corruption level police   23 1.80 4.5 3.19 0.71 
Perceived corruption level judiciary  23 1.68 4.48 3.27 0.83 
Perceived corruption level parliament   23 2.38 4.3 3.59 0.52 
Perceived corruption level political 
parties 
 23 2.75 4.50 3.92 0.42 
       
Perceived corruption public sector  23 2.19 4.62 3.96 0.65 
       
Question wording expert perception of 
corruption (CPI 2013) 
Indicator is based on multiple data sources that 
ask a wide range of questions to assess the 
level of corruption in the public sector of a 
country based on the answers of experts 
(public officials and businessmen; higher is 
better).   
23 0 100   
Expert perception perceived corruption   23 25 91 59.61 20.1 
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corruption levels of the parliament. The means presented in table 2 suggests that implementing 
institutions are characterized by higher confidence levels, but also better (lower) scores on the level 
of perceived corruption. It is also interesting to note that citizens evaluate the level of corruption 
in the public sector of their country more negatively than any of the four individual institutions 
(3.96).   
 The main hypothesis in this thesis states that we expect to observe a strong negative 
correlation between the level of perceived corruption and institutional confidence levels. In this 
section, all tables presenting the data of my analysis between the dependent and independent 
variables will be shortly introduced after which they will be presented and discussed. In table 3 to 
6, the results of the means of all variables are presented per country sorted by the lowest score on 
the dependent variable (trust in institutions) and assigned a rank from 1 (worst) to 23 (best) for 
each institution. In order to make sense of the data, table 7 shows the difference in ranking of the 
country scores on each variable.  
  This makes it possible to easily identify the relative scores of each country per institution. 
Following Mariën (2011), I’ve grouped the relative rankings of the countries means on basis of 
four categories. Those categories include the Nordic countries, other established democracies, 
Southern European countries (including Israel), and new democracies. The countries in table 3 to 
6 are assigned a color representing each group of countries that helps to visually recognize each 
country with the group of countries they represent. Lastly, table 9 presents the result of the 
correlation analysis between the dependent and independent variables at both the level of individual 
institutions and at the system level. 
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Table 4. Means confidence legal system and perceived corruption level judiciary 
 Confidence 
legal system 
(ESS) 
 Perceived corruption 
judiciary 
(GCB) 
 Expert 
perception 
(CPI) 
 
Country Mean Rank Mean Rank Score Rank 
Ukraine 1.87 1 4.48 1 25 1 
Bulgaria 2.25 2 4.38 3 41 5 
Kosovo 2.7 3 4.31 5 33 4 
Slovakia 3.23 4 4 6 47 7 
Slovenia 3.28 5 3.57 8 57 10 
Portugal 3.48 6 3.89 7 62 13 
Albania 3.51 7 4.32 4 31 3 
Russia 3.57 8 4.41 2 28 2 
Spain 3.7 9 3.48 10 59 11 
Czech Republic 4.04 10 3.52 9 48 8 
Italy 4.46 11 3.39 11 43 6 
Hungary 4.66 12 3.05 14 54 9 
Cyprus 4.82 13 3.1 13 63 14 
Belgium 4.92 14 3.29 12 75 17 
Estonia 4.94 15 2.81 17 68 15 
France 5.03 16 3.04 15 71 16 
United Kingdom 5.52 17 2.68 18 76 18 
Israel 5.61 18 2.93 16 61 12 
Germany 5.83 19 2.61 19 78 19 
Switzerland 6.51 20 2.2 20 85 20 
Finland 7.04 21 2.01 22 89 22 
Norway 7.22 22 2.03 21 86 21 
Denmark 7.68 23 1.68 23 91 23 
Table 3. Means confidence police and perceived corruption level police 
 
 
 
Confidence police 
 
(ESS) 
 Perceived 
corruption police 
(GCB) 
 Expert 
perception 
(CPI) 
 
 
Country Mean Rank Mean Rank Score Rank 
Ukraine 2.05 1 4.42 2 25 1 
Russia 3.49 2 4.5 1 28 2 
Bulgaria 3.52 3 3.89 4 41 5 
Slovakia 4.15 4 3.76 5 47 7 
Kosovo 4.68 5 3.05 15 33 4 
Albania 4.91 6 3.72 6 31 3 
Cyprus 5.08 7 4.09 3 63 14 
Czech Republic 5.1 8 3.62 7 48 8 
Israel 5.12 9 3.5 8 61 12 
Hungary 5.34 10 3.25 10 54 9 
Portugal 5.37 11 3.17 12 62 13 
Slovenia 5.38 12 3.17 13 57 10 
Spain 5.88 13 3.08 14 59 11 
Estonia 5.9 14 2.59 19 68 15 
France 5.93 15 3.28 9 71 16 
Italy 6.11 16 2.86 17 43 6 
Belgium 6.12 17 3.23 11 75 17 
United Kingdom 6.53 18 3.02 16 76 18 
Germany 6.84 19 2.71 18 78 19 
Norway 7.16 21 2.4 20 86 21 
Switzerland 7.16 20 2.26 21 85 20 
Denmark 7.95 22 2 22 91 23 
Finland 8.1 23 1.8 23 89 22 
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Table 6. Means confidence political parties and perceived corruption level political parties 
 Confidence 
political parties 
(ESS) 
 Perceived corruption 
political parties 
(GCB) 
 Expert 
perception 
(CPI) 
 
Country Mean Rank Mean Rank Score Rank 
Bulgaria 1.8 1 4.14 8 41 5 
Portugal 1.87 2 4.1 10 62 13 
Spain 1.88 3 4.35 3 59 11 
Ukraine 1.9 4 4.12 9 25 1 
Italy 2 5 4.5 1 43 6 
Kosovo 2.01 6 4.25 4 33 4 
Slovenia 2.27 7 4.17 7 57 10 
Albania 2.32 8 4.03 13 31 3 
Cyprus 2.46 9 4.43 2 63 14 
Czech Republic 2.69 10 4.07 11 48 8 
Slovakia 2.74 11 3.87 16 47 7 
Russia 3.01 12 4.19 6 28 2 
France 3.13 13 4.04 12 71 16 
Israel 3.14 14 4.2 5 61 12 
Estonia 3.2 15 3.67 19 68 15 
Hungary 3.24 16 3.88 14 54 9 
United Kingdom 3.61 17 3.85 17 76 18 
Germany 3.68 18 3.81 18 78 19 
Belgium 4.23 19 3.88 15 75 17 
Finland 4.89 20 3.32 20 89 22 
Switzerland 4.99 21 3.27 21 85 20 
Norway 5.15 22 3.26 22 86 21 
Denmark 5.31 23 2.75 23 91 23 
Table 5. Means confidence parliament and perceived corruption level parliament 
 Confidence parliament 
 
(ESS) 
 Perceived corruption 
parliament 
(GCB) 
 Expert 
perception 
(CPI) 
 
Country Mean Rank Mean Rank Score Rank 
Ukraine 1.85 1 4.24 2 25 1 
Bulgaria 2.07 2 4.01 5 41 5 
Portugal 2.57 3 3.93 7 62 13 
Kosovo 2.63 4 3.94 6 33 4 
Albania 2.92 5 3.87 10 31 3 
Slovenia 2.96 6 3.89 8 57 10 
Czech Republic 3.14 7 3.75 11 48 8 
Italy 3.16 8 4.09 3 43 6 
Slovakia 3.17 9 3.74 9 47 7 
Russia 3.39 10 4.3 1 28 2 
Spain 3.43 11 3.87 9 59 11 
Cyprus 3.46 12 4.02 4 63 14 
Hungary 3.91 13 3.6 14 54 9 
Estonia 3.94 14 3.12 19 68 15 
Israel 4.12 15 3.63 13 61 12 
France 4.12 16 3.49 17 71 16 
United Kingdom 4.21 17 3.59 15 76 18 
Germany 4.74 18 3.38 18 78 19 
Belgium 5.02 19 3.49 16 75 17 
Finland 5.91 20 2.89 20 89 22 
Denmark 6.1 21 2.38 23 91 23 
Switzerland 6.14 22 2.76 21 85 20 
Norway 6.28 23 2.57 22 86 21 
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Table 7. Difference in ranking dependent and independent variables 
 Police Judiciary/ Legal system Parliament Political Parties 
 
 
 
ESS-
GCB 
ESS-
CPI 
GCB-
CPI 
ESS-
GCB 
ESS-
CPI 
GCB-
CPI 
ESS-
GCB 
ESS-
CPI 
GCB-
CPI 
ESS-
GCB 
ESS-
CPI 
GCB-
CPI 
DV/IV DV/IV IV/IV DV/IV DV/IV IV/IV DV/IV DV/IV IV/IV DV/IV DV/IV IV/IV 
Nordic countries             
Finland 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 -2 -2 0 -2 -2 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2 0 0 0 0 
Norway 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 
Other established democracies             
Switzerland -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 
Germany 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 
United Kingdom 2 -1 -1 0 -1 0 2 -1 -3 0 -1 -1 
Belgium 6 2 -3 -5 -3 -5 3 2 -1 4 2 -2 
France 6 1 0 -1 0 -1 -1 0 1 1 -3 -4 
Southern Europe            
Italy -1 0 5 5 5 5 5 2 -3 4 -1 -5 
Spain -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 2 0 -2 0 -8 -8 
Portugal -1 -1 -7 -6 -7 -6 -4 -10 -6 -8 -11 -3 
Israel 1 2 6 4 6 4 2 3 1 9 2 -7 
Cyprus 4 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 8 -2 -10 7 -5 -12 
New democracies             
Estonia -5 -2 0 2 0 2 -5 -1 4 -4 0 4 
Slovenia -1 -3 -5 -2 -5 -2 -2 -4 -2 0 -3 -3 
Hungary 0 -2 3 5 3 5 -1 4 5 2 7 5 
Czech Republic 1 1 2 1 2 1 -4 -1 3 -1 2 3 
Albania 0 3 4 1 4 1 -5 2 7 -5 5 10 
Kosovo -10 -2 -1 1 -1 1 -2 0 2 2 2 0 
Slovakia -1 -2 -3 -1 -3 -1 0 2 2 -5 4 9 
Bulgaria -1 -1 -3 -2 -3 -2 -3 -3 0 -7 -4 3 
Russia 1 6 6 0 6 0 9 8 -1 6 10 4 
Ukraine -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 1 -5 3 8 
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Table 8. Correlation analysis trust and perceived corruption levels individual institutions * 
 Trust 
police 
Trust legal 
system 
Trust 
parliament 
Trust political 
parties 
Institutional 
trust 
No. of countries 23 23 23 23 23 
Perceived corruption police -.916** -.766** -.762** -.683** (-.823**) 
Perceived corruption judiciary -.897** -.963** -.909** -.849** (-.950**) 
Perceived corruption parliament -.813** -.875** -.906** -.904** (-.912**) 
Perceived corruption political parties -.651** -.748** -.811** -.886** (-.801**) 
Perceived corruption public sector (-780**) (-.853**) (-.886**) (-.910**) (-.892**) 
CPI (.795**) (.885**) (.872**) (.808**) (.906**) 
* The results within brackets indicate that the variable captures corruption and institutional trust at the system level.  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). All correlation coefficients show a p value of 0.000 
associated with the correlation. 
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Findings 
In this section the results of my analysis will be posited. The analysis of the strength of the 
relationship between the variables conducted at the level of individual institutions (table 8) will 
first be presented, after which this section proceeds with discussing the results of the country level 
means in more detail. The result of the correlation analysis between the means of the perceived 
corruption levels and institutional confidence levels in our sample of 23 countries (table 8) confirms 
the strong negative relationship between corruption and institutional trust as hypothesized in the 
beginning of this thesis. The scores that are made bold in table 8 represent the results of the strength 
of the relationship between institutional trust and the level of perceived corruption measured at the 
level of each individual institution. In the methodological section of this thesis the assumption was 
posited that we expect to observe that institutions which are perceived to be most corrupt, are also 
less trusted by citizens. The descriptive statistics presented in table 2 confirmed that this is the case 
as noted earlier in this chapter.  
 However, the correlation analysis shows that the means of the results of both trust in 
political parties and trust in the parliament are more closely related to the means of the perceived 
corruption level of other institutions. What this means is that there is a stronger relationship 
between how much trust citizens have in political parties and how corrupt they perceive the 
parliament to be than between how corrupt they evaluate each individual institution. In the case of 
trust in the parliament, this difference is negligible although the perception of the judiciary still 
shows a stronger relationship between both concepts. In both cases, the second strongest 
relationship relates to the institution captured by both variables.    
 The data in table 8 also shows that the biggest differences are observed in the case of the 
strength of the relationship between trust levels and perceived corruption levels of the police and 
political parties. This is shown by the relatively low Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the 
means of the trust levels and perceived corruption levels of both institutions (-0.916/-0.651 and -
.886/-0.683). This indicates that people evaluate both institutions in a relatively distinct way, 
although all correlation coefficients shown in this analysis are relatively strong.   
 Despite those differences, the results presented in table 8 show that in general, the strongest 
relationship is found when we compare the relationship of corruption and institutional trust at the 
level of the same institutions which is in the case of all 4 institutions stronger than the comparison 
of experts measuring the overall level of corruption (CPI). In addition, the relatively high 
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differences between some institutions (most notably, the police and political parties) indicate that 
citizen use more distinct evaluations for some institutions than for others (the parliament and the 
judiciary). This observation would not be possible by studying the relationship between both 
concepts at the system level, and my analysis seems to suggest thus far that at least in the case of 
the police and political parties, citizens make relatively distinct evaluations between how corrupt 
they perceive each institution to be and how much confidence they possess in those institutions.    
 The following section will discuss the results of table 3-7 in which the country means 
between both variables are compared with each other. The results of table 3-6 focused at the level 
of each institution show that, in general, countries which score worst on the level of perceived 
corruption (indicated by the lower rankings) are also characterized by the lowest confidence levels 
in those institutions. However, despite the fact that in general, this clear trend is visible, the 
comparison of the relative rankings presented in table 7 shows that there are interesting variations 
between both the evaluation of the institutions in general, the differences between the groups of 
countries and the results of some individual countries.      
 First, the ranking results presented in table 7 show that there is considerable variation 
between the scores on each institution between the dependent and independent variables based on 
public opinion (ESS-GCB). The ranking scores in table 7 show that judiciary presents the least 
amount of variation amongst the ranking results followed closely by the police, whereas the 
parliament and political parties show much more variation in ranking. What this means is that 
citizens’ evaluations in the case of the trust and corruption in the judiciary and the police are more 
stable, and vary considerably more in the case of political parties and the parliament which might 
be accounted for by the fact that the latter institutions are partisan, while the former are usually 
characterized by more impartial rule, the effect of which might be stronger in countries where 
people are unsatisfied with politics.  
 Focusing on the different groups of countries, the data in table 7 shows that the evaluations 
of both Nordic countries and other established democracies are relatively stable in comparison to 
the scores of countries in Southern Europe and countries that are categorized as new democracies. 
The data in table 7 also suggests that there are notable differences between both independent 
variables between Southern European countries and countries categorized as new democracies in 
the case of citizen corruption levels in political parties. While all countries in Southern Europe 
show negative ranking scores between both variables, most New democracies show positive 
 25 
 
rankings instead. What this means is that countries in Southern Europe overestimate the level of 
corruption present in political parties relative to the country score attributed by experts, while most 
countries in the category new democracies show relatively much confidence in this institution in 
comparison to how corrupt experts perceive their countries to be. This effect is not caused solely 
by the higher ranking of those countries in terms of CPI score, as table 6 shows that the country 
means of Southern European countries are amongst the worst of all scores.  
 Focusing on the results on some of the individual countries, the results of table 7 show that 
in the case of trust in the police in both France and Belgium, the difference in ranking between the 
results of the ESS (DV) and the GCB (IV) are considerable given the otherwhise relatively stable 
rankings within this group of countries. This means citizens in both countries possess relatively 
much confidence in the police in comparison to how corrupt they perceive this institution to be in 
relation to the scores of other countries.  In addition, France and Belgium also stand out by the 
relatively high negative score between the ranking of both independent variables (GCB-CPI) which 
is also caused by the relatively high negative score that citizens in those countries attribute to this 
institution as experts attribute a more positive score on the overall level of corruption in those 
countries.  
 The country result of Russia is also remarkable. In the case of three of the four institutions 
(the police being the exception), the differences between institutional trust levels and perceived 
corruption levels are notably high and go in the same direction. That is, we can observe that citizen 
confidence levels are very high compared to that of other countries relative to the high level of 
corruption that Russian citizens attribute to those institutions. In addition, in the case of Italy, the 
results on confidence and corruption levels of the police also shows that citizens possess relatively 
high confidence in this institution compared to the high level of perceived corruption that citizens 
attribute to this institution and the overall country score by experts. The differences in the variation 
between the dependent and independent variables that are presented in this thesis are unique in that 
following the method of how corruption and institutional trust is usually studied, such differences 
are neglected. The findings presented in this chapter present interesting insights between the 
relationship of measures of corruption and institutional trust that can provide a basis for additional 
research that can help explain those observations. 
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Limitations and further research 
The biggest limitation of the exploration presented in this thesis is the fact that only a relatively 
small number of countries have been analyzed which results in finding relatively high correlation 
coefficients for all institutions. Due to time and format limitations, issues of endogeneity have also 
been left aside.5 The data presented in the exploration on the results of institutional trust and 
perceived corruption of individual countries can be used in qualitative studies of those countries to 
help explain the observed findings for those countries. In addition, quantitative research can show 
whether the observed relationships prove to be robust.  
Conclusion 
The main goal of the present study is to explore two issues on the study of corruption and 
institutional trust that have gone relatively unnoticed in the literature on this topic. First, this thesis 
explores the similarity of two commonly used corruption perception indicators based on public 
opinion and the general assessment of experts given the seemingly contradictory statements made 
in the literature about the similarity of the GCB and the CPI indicators. It is shown that the 
similarity between both indicators heavily depends on the sample size used in the comparison. In 
addition, this thesis argues that the variance within the CPI data can account for this difference 
between both sample sizes, as there is much more variance within the CPI data than there is within 
the results of the GCB. A possible explanation has been presented on why there is so much 
discrepancy between both indicators that may account for the differences noted by some authors, 
although more research is needed to provide substantive conclusions on this issue.  
 The second empirical concern by which this thesis aims to increase the quality of the study 
of corruption relates to the way of the measurement of its effect on the level of institutional trust. 
The empirical contributions on this topic show that corruption deteriorates trust in public 
institutions. However, most authors have studied this effect by studying institutional trust at the 
system level, instead of looking at its effect on individual institutions. Given the degree of variance 
of how citizens evaluate distinct institutions in terms of both confidence levels and the level of 
corruption, this thesis has set out to explore whether the analysis at the level of individual 
institutions can provides more precise results.    
 The hypothesis which states that corruption negatively influences institutional trust is 
                                                 
5 For the analysis of the issue of endogeneity between corruption indicators and the level of trust in institutions, see Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri 
(2011). 
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accepted based on the findings presented in this thesis following the scholarly consensus on the 
trust deteriorating effect of corruption. While the relatively small sample size of the analysis 
conducted in this thesis has to be kept in mind, the findings show that in general, investigating 
perceived corruption levels and the level of trust conducted at the level of individual institutions 
provides the strongest relationship between both concepts. In addition, the analysis presented in 
this thesis is able to capture some findings which are not noticed in the study of both concept at the 
system level.  
 First, this study suggests that citizen evaluation on the perceived level of corruption and the 
level of confidence of some institutions are more closely related than that of others. Most notably, 
citizens seem to evaluate the police and political parties in terms of confidence and corruption more 
distinctively than they do for other institutions suggesting that the effect of corruption is better 
studied independently in case of those two institutions. In addition, this thesis is able to capture the 
variation between the results of the dependent and independent for each institution, the scores of 
each group of countries, and at the level of individual countries providing unique insights to the 
effect of corruption on institutional trust that can be used for additional research on this topic. 
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